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TWO "COLORED"+ WOMEN'S
CONVERSATION ABOUT THE RELEVANCE
OF FEMINIST LAW JOURNALS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY++
TA UNYA LO VELL BANKS* AND PENELOPE
ANDREWS"
INTRODUCTION
The invitation to participate in the Columbia Journal of Gender and
Law symposium on the relevance of feminist law journals provided an ideal
opportunity for us to reassess our collective endeavors as teachers, scholars,
and advocates committed to social justice. Feminist methodology and
epistemology have been instrumental in shaping our conceptual
frameworks. So, too, have other theories of law that seek to unearth the
structural impediments, hidden biases, and methodological limitations of
the law in redressing injustice.
As black women (one from the United States and the other from
South Africa), the concerns of race have been central to our analysis of the
world and in our decisions to be lawyers. It is through the prism of racial
discrimination that we confronted injustice, and our early endeavors, both
academic and practical, used law as an instrument to eliminate injustice.
Feminism came into our lives later, but it served to enrich our analysis
about overcoming all impediments to equality. This was particularly
important as the focus of equality both in the United States and South
Africa served to privilege racial equality while ignoring the intersection of
race and gender on the status of women. Feminist law journals have been an
+ During the Apartheid era in South Africa certain "mixed-race" individuals were
classified by the South African government as "colored" as opposed to African, Indian, or
white. At various points in United States history, people with known African ancestry either
called themselves, or were called, "colored." Thus, we use the term "colored" in the title as
both a descriptive and ascriptive term suggesting that sometimes cultural race, a voluntary
identification, is so intertwined with externally imposed race, that separation of the two is
impossible. How we see ourselves and how others see us shapes our vision of the world.
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indispensable part of our intellectual journeys-one that we plan to
continue on as the nature and forms of discrimination alter.
We embarked on the conversation that follows in an attempt to
assess the influence of feminist law journals on our lives and scholarship,
and where we would like to see feminist law journals go in the future.
The conversation begins:
Taunya: One of the initial questions posed by the conveners of this
symposium was: "What is the historical meaning of feminist law
journals? What resonance do they have for law students, professors, and
lawyers today and at their inception?" Perhaps one answer is that
almost twenty years ago, feminist law journals were established to
create safe spaces for students and professors interested in gender
issues, considered soft scholarship.
Twenty years later many of the subjects embraced in the early years
of feminist journals, like reproductive freedom, equal employment
opportunities, rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence, have
become mainstream, and are as likely to appear in traditional law
journals as they are to appear in feminist law journals.' Articles by
women legal scholars on a wide variety of legal topics appear with
regularity in all types of law journals. So, do you agree with my starting
premise about the reason for feminist law journals, or is that premise
also contested?
Penny: I agree with your first premise. However, one could argue about
whether contemporary feminist legal scholarship, although still treated
with some skepticism in traditional legal circles, is no longer regarded
as "soft" scholarship. But your premise about the origins of feminist
law journals is correct.
Taunya: On second thought, however, our premise that feminist
scholarship has been accepted in mainstream law reviews may be
illusory since an article by Laura Rosenbury that also appears in this
issue of the journal, looking at the content of law journals between 1978
and 2002, found that only 189 out of 1,637 "feminist" articles were
published in mainstream law journals.2 On the other hand, your
definition of what constitutes feminist scholarship may differ from
Professor Rosenbury's. Thus, the difference between perception and
reality may depend on the feminist issue presented and whether the
1 See Laura A. Rosenbury, Feminist Legal Scholarship: Charting Topics and
Authors, 1978-2002, 12 Colum. J. Gender & L. 446 (2003) (comparing contents of articles in
feminist journals and feminist articles in prestigious law reviews).
2 Id. at 447-48.
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argument being advanced in the article is consistent with or at odds
with what we call mainstream legal scholarship. Some issues, usually
involving formal equality, are clearly mainstream, while other issues
are not.3
Penny: I do not know if I would accept at face value this clear
demarcation between "mainstream" and "other." I am not sure that this
binary takes account of the contextualized and fluid nature of these
concepts. I think that these definitions need to be problematized
somewhat, since what is mainstream is often contingent on a whole host
of extra-legal factors, including timing. If one, for example, looks at the
development of the law regarding sexual harassment, you notice that
the issues moved from the margins to the mainstream fairly rapidly.
Most of these developments occur not so much in a linear fashion, but
rather as a consequence of extra-legal processes which impact on the
perception of the issue, that is, mainstream or other.
Taunya: Perhaps a more accurate statement is that some forms of
contemporary feminist legal scholarship have become mainstream, but
not others, and then ask whether these "less conventional" feminist
theories are more likely to be found in feminist journals than in
mainstream journals. Perhaps feminist journals need to exist to help
feminists push the envelope to provide a space to discuss "less
conventional" feminist subjects and theories and promote more honest
intra-feminist critiques. We are in need of a new coherent, all-inclusive
vision of feminism to replace the mainstream American model. Thus,
the goals of feminist law journals must be reworked to provide a forum
for non-white women and less powerful women globally.
Penny: But have feminists succeeded in pushing the envelope? I think,
as a general proposition, that one can think of mainstream feminist
journals as succeeding on many levels, and possibly even with respect
to inclusivity. I want to return to the original point about the raison
d'etre for feminist law journals, that is, the production o fknowledge
from a feminist p erspective and a ccess t o knowledge for w omen and
other scholars committed to principles of gender equality. One can
argue that the feminist legal project in this regard has been
successful. In other words, feminist law journals have provided an
indispensable context for the development of alternative approaches to
legal knowledge which place women's concerns at the center.4
3 Professor Rosenbury found that few journals, feminist or mainstream, contained
articles about women and poverty. Id. at 458-59.
' See Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender (Katherine T. Bartlett
& Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
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What has been essential in the reproduction of a feminist
epistemology has been the challenge to concepts such as "objectivity"
and "neutrality." Here feminist legal scholars have been fellow travelers
with other critical legal scholars (especially those who focus on
questions of racial discrimination and wider questions about justice). In
other words, the challenge to the "natural order" of racial hierarchies in
this country also allowed for the challenge to the "natural order" of
gender hierarchies.5
If I were exploring these questions in a longer paper, I would go
beyond the borders of this country to explore the role of feminist law
journals in examining and highlighting the feminist condition rendered
by global processes of exclusion and marginalization. My exploration
of these i ssues would raise questions about the relevance of feminist
legal scholarship to the lives of less affluent women around the globe
and the possibilities for legal and other reforms generated by such
scholarship.
Taunya: Your last point about the role of feminist law journals in
examining and highlighting the global feminist condition with respect
to marginalization and exclusion is important, and seems confirmed by
Professor Rosenbury's study.6 A harder question, however, i s how to
determine whether an article accomplishes this goal. I am thinking
about Isabelle Gunning's critique about Western feminists'
condemnation of genital mutilation-without consulting or considering
the perspective of the non-Western women whose rights they claimed
to protect--the imposition of Western values and perspectives on non-
Western cultures.7
Penny: More importantly, and distinct from the question of
accountability to those whose rights are apparently being protected (the
non-Western abused woman), is the very concept of "culture." My
impression is that feminist law journals have interrogated quite
thoroughly the subordination of women through a variety of cultural
5 For a discussion about these issues in the Australian context, see Penelope E.
Andrews, Violence Against Aboriginal Women in Australia: Possibilities for Redress from
the International Human Rights Framework 60 Alb. L. Rev. 917 (1997); see also Critical
Race Feminism: A Reader (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
6 Rosenbury, supra note 1.
7 Isabelle Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural
Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 189, 191
(1992). A more recent example is the unintentionally harmful interventions by feminists and
human rights groups on behalf ofAmina Lawal during ongoing judicial proceedings. Ms.
Lawal was sentenced to death by stoning under Nigerian Shari'a Penal Legislation for
allegedly having a child out of wedlock.
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mechanisms in non-Western societies, or in minority non-Western
communities within the United States. Sometimes feminist scholars
have accomplished this laudable task with or without the collusion of
non-Western feminists who live in the United States, or the country in
which the particular culture is located.' What is of concern to me, and
goes back to your point about "pushing the envelope," is whether this
has been done in a theoretically candid manner.
What do I mean by this? The discussion about culture always
occurs as if culture is "out there." As some Third World feminists point
out, often culture is treated as if it belongs only to the "other." 9 So, the
discussion in feminist law journals, even when driven by feminist
sensibilities of solidarity and the new feminist universalism, does not
take account of the culture within the United States.' °
Let me offer an example: this country is probably one of the more
formally equal societies in the world. Yet one of the phenomena of this
liberated society is the excessive amount of money that middle-aged
and middle-class women spend on cosmetic surgery and products such
as botox to reduce the ravages of age. What kind of liberation is this?
What kind o f culture allows women to engage in a form o fphysical
mutilation to avoid the inevitability of aging? What kind of cultural
message is being transmitted to young women; that equality is not so
much about changing women's material conditions (wages, conditions
of employment, fundamental rights to reproduction, and so on) but
more about c ontinuing an image of women that takes us back a few
centuries? It is an elitist preoccupation that has enormous cultural and
economic consequences for all women in this society.
Taunya: Are you critiquing the hyper-capitalism and materialism of
late twentieth-century America, or does the dominance and prominence
of Western (predominately United States) culture simply overshadow
other types of physical enhancements done by women in other
countries-some, but not all, influenced by the Western media? I am
thinking of genital circumcision, or the popularity of skin lighteners and
hair straighteners in African and Caribbean countries.
Cosmetic surgery also is fairly routine for middle-class and affluent
women in Latin American countries like Brazil and Eastern countries
8 See L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 275
(1997).
9 See, e.g., Gunning, supra note 7; see also Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of
Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the "Native" Subiect in International/Post-Global
Feminist Legal Politics, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1 (2002).
1) See Fedwa Malti-Douglas, As the World (or Dare I Say the Globe) Turns:
Feminism and Transnationalism, 4 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 137 (1996).
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like Japan and South Korea. Women's global concern with physical
enhancements simply illustrates how, even in affluent countries where
women h ave m ore wealth, real power a nd wealth s till l ies w ith men.
Perhaps Virginia Woolf was wrong when she said that women need
their own money and a room of their own. These things do not seem to
solve the problem, and I suggest that Andrea Dworkin might have been
on to something in her book Intercourse." Too many affluent
heterosexual American women, like other heterosexual women around
the world, are still overly concerned with attracting men, whether to
provide financial support, as companions, or to gain approval (fathers,
employers, etc.).
Penny: I am not sure if I would put genital circumcision alongside skin
lighteners and hair straighteners. Even though genital surgeries are
culturally mandated, they lack the aspect of voluntariness that is
arguably key to the beauty industry. I know that voluntary is a loaded
term, but genital surgeries are imposed on girls by adults. But this may
just be a minor point.
What one has to look at is how the law intervenes in these
situations, and particularly how feminist legal theory, and by extension
feminist law journals, have played a part in providing either a healthy
and rigorous critique of these practices, or whether feminists really have
only a muted response to these issues. 2 There have been some
interesting analyses by feminist social theorists, anthropologists, and
philosophers, but feminist legal theorists have lagged somewhat behind.
If I had to imagine the kind of intervention that feminist law
journals could make, it would be an attempt to disentangle the different
layers of feminist subordination and discrimination by focusing on
outward manifestations of discrimination that the law could more easily
address. So, for example, there would be universal consensus about
legal equality (the right to vote, equal pay, and so on). I would venture
to argue that despite its current controversy in the United States, even
reproductive i ssues, if framed i n a privacy a rgument, would generate
sufficient agreement for legal reform. What would be more
" Dworkin's theory is that because of the physical design of women's bodies and
the existence of sexual intercourse, women have less bodily privacy then men. Andrea
Dworkin, Intercourse (1987). As Linda McClain said, explaining Dworkin's theory, "[T]here
is never a real privacy of the body that can co-exist with intercourse." Linda C. McClain,
Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 Yale J.L. & Human.
195, 222 (1995) (quoting Dworkin, supra, at 122-23).
12 There is a wonderful series of essays dealing with these difficult questions and
raising them in contexts of autonomy, responsibility, gender roles, and reproductive capacity.
See "Naging" Questions: Feminist Ethics in Everyday Life (Dana E. Bushnell ed., 1995);
see also Cheryl B. Preston, Baby Spice: Lost Between Feminine and Feminist, 9 Am. U. J.
Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 541 (2001).
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controversial, and therefore result in fewer consensuses, would be these
different cultural questions involving, for example, beauty
competitions, cosmetic surgery, botox injections, and skin lighteners.
Law's imperatives may not be appropriate here.
Taunya: I also asked whether feminist law journals have failed to
fulfill their promise. There is little discussion in most feminist law
journals about working with all women as equal partners, or
championing issues, like racism, that might work against the economic
interests o f a ffluent Western w omen. Articles a bout reproduction and
child-rearing appear with frequency in feminist and mainstream
journals, yet few legal scholars question the unresolved tension within
feminism about the value of mothering, non-capital producing labor,
compared with capital producing labor outside the home.' 3 If mothering
is so important to society and to some women, then feminist journals
might convene symposiums to address the consequences of twentieth-
century feminism that stressed equality outside the home but failed to
resolve equality issues inside the home. Feminists generally have failed
to address and resolve the issue of unpaid labor in the home and why
this labor remains women's work.'
4
Penny: I want to respond here to your particular point about the lack of
attention to working with women as equal partners. This raises a
question that is central to the legal academy, and goes back to the
earlier point about the establishment of feminist law journals. The
disconnection between the arcane world of the academy and the "real
life" problems of people is apparent. For example, you and I have often
lamented the proliferation of law reviews. Not to denigrate the
important scholarship being pursued in many journals-which the
courts and other actors in the legal system no doubt find useful on
occasion--but as long as law reviews serve as vessels for the pursuit of
tenure, the relevance of much of the theoretical enquiry will be
questioned. Do not get me wrong; I am not making an anti-intellectual
argument. I am merely raising an issue that I believe some scholars are
grappling with, particularly progressive scholars. There are some
13 See generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Toward A Global Critical Feminist Vision:
Domestic Work and The Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. Gender Race & Just. 1 (1999); Katharine
Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 Yale J.L. & Feminism 81,
100-04 (1997). Ironically, in some ways the nineteenth-century feminists who claimed a
property right in their household labor were far ahead of contemporary feminists. See Reva
B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claim Conceming Wives Household
Labor, 1850-1880, 103 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1994); see also Mona Charen, Will Feminists
Open Their Minds to Motherhood?, Balt. Sun, Oct. 28, 2002, at 9A.
14 Twila L. Perry, Caretakers, Entitlement, and Diversity, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc.
Pol'y & L. 153, 156 (1999).
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academics whose work has some real life application-I am thinking of
William Julius Wilson's work on social welfare 5 and Catharine
MacKinnon's on sexual harassment 6 and of course there are many
others. Feminist journals were supposed to be different. They were set
up, amongst other things, not to mimic mainstream law reviews but to
provide a space where women's issues could be dealt with thoughtfully.
It is in this regard--the failure to include women who are
marginalized-that to some extent feminist law journals have fallen
short of one aspect of their mission.
This is particularly the case with racism. Questions of
intersectionality h ave b een p ursued b y a few j ournals, a nd t hey h ave
pursued them with vigor and creativity. I wonder, though, how
widespread these theoretical developments are.
Taunya: Perhaps feminist journals were never set up to bridge or
address the gap between the academy and the bar, to provide a space to
discuss praxis. In fact, I would argue that early feminist writers were
very theory-oriented, with people theorizing on issues that came from
practice, but with very few so-called feminist scholars proposing
anything more radical than treating women the same as men under the
law. Thus, you had critical legal feminists advancing arguments on why
a formal equality approach would not work, and these scholars
fragmented over whether biological versus social versus bio-social
reasons explained why formal equality would not work.' 7 Arguably, the
only thing that was different about these discussions from the
discussions in the mainstream joumals was that women, not men, were
at the center. Of course, the problem was with the universalizing of
women as white, heterosexual, middle or upper class, Christian or
Jewish, and Western, particularly American.
Penny: It may be opportune here to raise the point about the theoretical
connections between the elimination of racial discrimination and gender
discrimination, which some feminist law journals have explored.
"5 See, e.g., William Julius Wilson, The Bridge Over the Racial Divide: Rising
Inequality and C oalition Politics ( 1999); William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears:
The World of the New Urban Poor (1996); William Julius Wilson, The Truly
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public P olicy (1987); William Julius
Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions
(1978).
16 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life
and Law 103 (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words 43 (1993); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (1979);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist State (1989).
17 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, DeConstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797
(1989).
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Taunya: But have these journals explored this issue on a consistent
basis, or do they do so in a more token fashion-like Black History
Month is set aside for an examination of black issues?
Penny: I think that feminist law journals have followed the general
trend in law journals, focusing on a particular subject through the
symposium method. So a symposium is held on a particular subject
area, which also forms the basis for the volume of the journal. My sense
is that a significant n umber o f I aw journals h ave dedicated p articular
volumes to the question of the intersectionality of race, gender,
ethnicity, and sexuality. I cannot comment on whether these endeavors
have been conducted in a tokenistic manner.
Taunya: One area where feminist law journals could do more is by
examining and highlighting the global condition of women, by
exploring how non-Western women are exploited, marginalized, and
even excluded from full participation in their societies, sometimes by
other women. The real issues affecting less affluent Western and non-
Western women are not likely to get much exposure in fora supported
by elite Western I aw schools. As I wrote s everal years ago, feminist
journals and feminist legal scholars seldom focus on how affluent,
usually Western women exploit and oppress other women.'
8
Penny: To go back to the point about the link between the elimination
of gender oppression and racial oppression, one example that comes to
mind has been the constant tension between national liberation and
women's liberation. This was a theme of the civil rights struggle in the
United States, and also central to other contexts in which the centrality
of racial discrimination almost erased attention to gender
discrimination. Here I particularly think of the South African context
where feminist legal developments in the United States and elsewhere
assisted in shaping an indigenized version suitable for South Africa's
hybrid conditions of Western and African, and where competing claims
of gender equality and ethnic/national identities are constantly being
negotiated.' 9
Taunya: Were South African feminists really successful in getting their
issues incorporated into the reformulation of South Africa's
18 Banks, supra note 13, at 27; see also Regina Austin, Of False Teeth and Biting
Critiques: Jones v. Fisher in Context, 15 Touro L. Rev. 289, 397 (1999); Donna E. Young,
Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and Women's Work, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 1.
19 See Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in
South Africa, 3 Mich. I. Race & L. 307 (1998).
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constitution? I find it a bit ironic that gay men, rather than women, have
benefited most directly from some of South Africa's constitutional
equality provisions. Am I wrong in this regard?
Penny: South African women clearly succeeded in incorporating
women's rights in the Constitution and, in fact, rendered equality the
primary principle in the Bill of Rights. The South African Constitution
contains the most comprehensive listing of rights for women (and other
groups). Gay men, and a host of other groups, have clearly benefited
from the new constitutional dispensation, and have successfully
challenged a host of discriminatory laws in South Africa.20 But this
question of access to the courts is a large issue that we do not have time
to pursue here. Suffice it to say that despite the fact that black women,
the most disadvantaged group of people in South Africa, have not had
access to the South African Constitutional Court in the same way that
other more privileged groups have, black women will benefit directly
from the equality jurisprudence emanating from the Constitutional
Court.2
Taunya: Maybe I am expecting too much of feminist law journals.
Journal membership and publication still are closely tied to traditional
male-defined notions of success. For students, journal membership or
publication leads to prestigious clerkships, associate positions in white
shoe law firms, and even law professorships. After law school,
publication in a legal journal increasingly is a prerequisite for being
hired as a law teacher. Further, for law teachers, scholarship, whether
published in a feminist or mainstream journal, is linked to promotion
and tenure in the academy.
One last question raising perhaps a thornier issue is what if we are
wrong? What if the articles in these journals are much broader and
more representative than the articles in mainstream journals? Does this
mean that feminist journals are doing their job? Why would we think
that they are not? Is it because some feminist journals have themselves
become mainstream, and those feminist journals that are more
representative are less "prestigious" and less read?
20 See, e.g., National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice
1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); see also Satchwell v. President of Republic of South Africa 2002 (6)
SA I (CC).
21 See President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo CCT 11/96; see also S v.
Balovi CCT 29/99; Carnichele v. Minister of Safety and Security CCT 48/00 (2001 SACLR
LEXIS 64). All of these cases provide a comprehensive definition of equality, one that
eschews a version of narrow formal equality and embraces substantive equality.
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Penny: I do not know how to answer this question, except to say that
we all operate in the mainstream, even as feminists. The tools of our
trade are mechanisms to engage with the law. Law reform is our most
fundamental endeavor. That makes us very mainstream. There is, of
course, a wider debate i n t he I aw and s ociety movement, the critical
legal studies and critical race theory approaches, feminist legal theory,
and post-colonial and postmodern schools about the possibilities for
progressive lawyering. But as long as we have law as part of the
description of our work products, we are confined to a mainstream
paradigm.
Taunya: So you are saying that some feminists may have initially seen
feminist law journals as safe spaces for feminist scholars-women and
men-who want to air feminist issues while seeking tenure. But instead
of creating a new type of journal, feminist law journals tend to replicate
the traditional law journal model, only the focus is different. In 1938,
Virginia Woolf warned us that as women gain equal status and power in
society, they tend not to favor substantive change of that society.
22
Therefore, it is unsurprising that today feminist law journals, like most
scholarly journals, have little resonance for feminist lawyers because
the articles tend, like most journals, to be too theoretical or esoteric.
23
CONCLUSION
Our conversation is more a critique of the past than a recipe for the
future, but we need more open and honest conversation among and between
feminists and non-feminist women. These conversations will be difficult,
often uncomfortable and incomplete. Not only do race and sexuality
separate us, but increasingly, careerism as well.
The seeds for some of these conversations are found in the writings
of second- and third-generation legal feminists and non-feminists. Some
feminists question what they see as a feminist orthodoxy or canon in which
they are not included. In a similar vein, other feminists argue for writing
outside of feminism as a way to address issues affecting some women who
do not seem part of the late twentieth-century feminist canon. A few
established feminist scholars are troubled by these discussions. Despite the
seeming acceptance of feminist legal theory within the academy, these
feminist scholars still feel insecure and vulnerable inside their institutions,
especially when younger feminists challenge their scholarship. Too many
22 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (1938).
23 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 41-42 (1992); Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 2191, 2198 (1993).
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feminist legal scholars do not trust each other enough to have the kind of
open and probing conversations needed to move feminist legal theory
forward. In the final analysis, in a society in which divisions along race,
class, sexual orientation, ideology, and other lines still persist, trust may be
a casualty.
Before meaningful conversations can occur among feminist legal
scholars, we need to find a basis of commonality and trust. In the meantime,
there are multiple feminist legal projects, some complementary, which
show great promise. Thus, as we enter the twenty-first century, feminist
legal scholars must be willing to engage feminist legal scholars as well as
women scholars and activists who do not identify themselves as feminists.
Feminist law journals may be able to provide both the public and private
space to pursue these conversations.
